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Article 3

LORD HARDWICKE AND THE SCIENCE OF TRUST
LAW
The proximity of the second centennial of Lord Hardwicke's acceptance of the Great Seal makes this year an
opportune time in which to keep alive the memory of this
remarkable judicial codifier, by re-examining the lasting imprint made by him upon the equitable jurisprudence of England and the United States. Lord Campbell has described
him as "the man universally and deservedly considered the
most consummate judge who ever sat in the Court of Chancery-being distinguished not only for his rapid and satisfactory decision of the causes which came before him, but
for the profound and enlightened principles which he laid
down, and for perfecting English Equity into a symmetrical
science." 1 In the words of Chancellor Kent: "The present
wise and rational system of English equity jurisprudence
owes more to him than perhaps to any of his predecessors." 2
Lord Birkenhead has written that many of his judgments
have become "embodied in the very structure of Equity
and are followed every day in confident reliance upon their
inherent justice." 8 But the distinctive significance of his contribution to the Anglo-American legal world lies in his reduction of the justice-concept of English Chancery to approximately fixed principles.' On February 21st, 1737, he became Chancellor.5 From then on, he labored indefatigably
to forge those positive precepts which in his estimation would
best externalize the traditional philosophy of Chancery.
1
2

6 CAm rm, LiVEs oi T= LoRD CHANCELLOPS (1874) 73.
1 KxNT, CoiMnNTARiEs ox Am=mcA LAw (14th ed.) 494.

8 Brn nEAD, FOURTEEN ENGIzsH JuDGES (1926) 158.
4 See 6 CAIPBELL, op. dt. supra note 1, at 227. He there states that Lord
Hardwicke was the "finisher and almost the author of the immortal Code of
Equity to which his name might justly be attached.'
5 6 CAiwBEmLT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 107, n.
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Every phase of equitable jurisdiction felt the magic of his
juristic touch. But it was the law of trusts, most important
division of equity jurisprudence, at that time, which afforded
him his greatest opportunity to display his genius. It is an
unusual coincidence that the advent of the Hardwicke bicentennial comes in a period characterized by a renaissance
of trust law which aims at systematization. Within the past
few months, important and epoch-making works' on this
branch of jural science, particularly the Restatement of the
American Law Institute,7 have made their appearance. In
so far as they have had for their purpose the introduction of
a greater degree of systematical certainty with respect
to the law of trusts, they are the logical culmination of the
judicial achievement of the great Hardwicke. Strangely
enough, too, this is a jural era in which lawyers are debating
the wisdom of uniformity of state laws, and the advisability
of an institute of legislative science which will facilitate and
hasten the codification of American law. 8 This is also reminiscent of the days of Hardwicke. But that is not all Jurists
are today much concerned with the nature of the judicial
process, re-evaluating the worth of stare decisis, in the domain of both public and private law, and stressing the necessity of a creative judiciary.9 But are not these the very questions which confronted Chancery when Lord Hardwicke became Chancellor?
The uniqueness of Lord Hardwicke's imperishable work
in the realm of trust law is due to the application of a juristic
philosophy which, after successive stages, reached its maturity in the seventeenth century, to specific cases, in accordance with a systematic methodology, so as to make such law
6 For example, the exhaustive seven-volume work on Trusts and Trustees by
Professor Bogert, and a treatise on Spendthrift Trusts by Professor Griswold.
7 See 12 PsocsznnGs or THE AsssrctN LAW INsTrUTE (May, 1935) 149.
S See Kocourek. Project of an Institute of Legislative Science, 20 Am. BAR
Ass JoUR. (1934) 468.
9 Aumann, Some Changing Patterns in the Legal Order (1935) 24 Ky. L.
JoUR. 38, reprinted in 2 CURRENT LEGAL THOUGHT (1935) 215.
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scientific. This philosophy had been slowly but surely emerging through several centuries. It was originally based upon
a theophilosophical natural law ideology for which the juridical economy of England is indebted to Thomistic ecclesiastics." It was later enlarged by a reliance upon a pragmatic metaphysics, which resolved an actually existent res
into the duality of the legal and equitaible estate.11 It was
eventually rounded out by Lord Nottingham who added the
element of a judicial logic, which was to relate to more or
less determinate legal premises. 12 The philosophy of trust
10 Chancery was the offspring of a neo-scholastic idealism. This latter in turn
was the expression of a Thomistic tenet which insisted upon integrating philosophy and theology, or at least the theodicy of a personal Deity, and which
accomplished this by the formula of a natural law perceivable by reason. Belief
in the existence of such a law which set up a norm or standard of human conduct was inescapable once it was admitted that there was a personal God, a
divine Lawgiver, Who was concerned with the actions of men. The early ecclesiastical Chancellors thought that it was consistent with belief in a revealed Word
which stressed, among other things, a golden rule, for them to translate moral
and ethical rights into juridical rights, enforced by the State, through its tribunals, when it was reasonable thus to summon political sovereignty to the aid of
morals, and when the violation of such ethical rights involved proprietary consequences affecting the common good.
11 Although a moral and Deistic ideal had necessitated the exercise of an
equitable authority apart from the Common-Law tribunals, and although the
scholastic theory of the natural law had impelled the early Chancellors to assume jurisdictional powers over certain relationships, still further recourse to
philosophy was necessary. The subtleness of philosophy was required to reconcile
the Common Law's continuing control of the res with Chancery's necessary participation in such control, for an in personam moral authority would be futile if
the res could not thereby be affected. The aim of Chancery was to act ultimately
upon the res, even though proximately the Chancellors were making effective an
ethical ideal against the person, i. e., in personam. Ethical idealism was thus supplemented by a pragmatic metaphysics. It was imperative that Chancery work
out an equitable theory of property. The actualistic res must not be under the
exclusive control of the Common Law. In the realm of fiduciary relationships,
therefore, recourse to this metaphysical device which divided the res into a legal
and equitable estate proved advantazeous to the Chancellors. An actualistic res
thus became a metaphysical duality. The initial trust philosophy of Chancery was,
therefore, a fusion of natural-law ethics and utilitarian metaphysics.
12 In the middle of the seventeenth century, Chancery bad been taunted by
accredited Common-Law auth6rities because it bad not, sooner followed the principle of stare decisis. Selden's aphorism is well-known, namely, "Equity is a roguish thing. For law we have a measure . . . equity is according to the conscience
of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. 'Tis all
one as if they should make the standard for the measure a Chancellor's foot."
See 1 HoLDswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1926) 467 ff. That Chancery was
beginning to follow the doctrine of stare decisis at the time of Lord Nottingham
appears from the case of Cook v. Fountain, 3 Swans. 585, 591 (1672). In this
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law, therefore, was not fundamentally influenced by Lord
Hardwicke. His was the task to formulate objective, positive
precepts in accordance with this juridico-philosophical idealism which he inherited from the era which preceded him.
But in emphasizing the necessity of the syllogistic technique,
and of obtaining his original major premises, for the most
part, from the Common Law, Lord Hardwicke revealed a
masterful grasp of the possibilities latent in the marvellous
judicial heritage which he had received. Briefly, then, that
historical phase of Chancery which began with Lord Hardwicke was principally characterized by a continued adjustment of positive rules to a specific legal philosophy, by the
reconciliation of the mentality of the utilitarian legal encyclopedist with that of the natural law jurist, by the balancing
of the claims of Chancery and the Common law, respectively, to juristic leadership in eighteenth century England, and
by the fabrication of a science of trust law, by a process of
systematization.
Prior to an examination of the modus operandiunderlying
Lord Hardwicke's creation of a science of trust law, it may
be interesting to speculate concerning his jurisprudential
outlook. Certainly he seems to recognize an externally existing natural law of some sort, for he was guided by "the reason of the thing." 18 The whole tenor of his Chancellorship
was toward the effectuation of immutable principles of justice by a definite, yet elastic positive law. This was to be
done in the light of contemporary social and economic conperiod, Chancery was reasoninz that since it had worked out metaphysically the
existence of an equitable, as distinguished from a legal estate, both referable to
an identical, actualistic res, and since the legal estate had become the object of
definite, written rules which were being applied with recurring consistency, whenever the character of the facts in successive legal disputes was substantially the
same, it would be judicially logical to utilize the same technique. This tendency
toward stare decisis increased in Chancery throughout the eighteenth century.
1 See 1 WOOD OUSFIZ.E, MEMOIRS or TfE LiE AND WRrrnws or LoRn
KAMIES. LORD "ARDwICEE's LETTER TO LORD KAWMS (1807) 239, 246, 248. At 246.
Hardwicke writes: "In our courts of equity general rules are established, as far
as it has been judged the nature of things would admit . . ." The letter was

written on June 30, 1759. See 6 CAMPBELL, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 231.
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ditions." In his efforts to balance the equity of the individual against that of society, he displayed a teleological conception of law, which apparently brings his work in -line with
the fundamentals of Thomism. Fortunately for the history
of Chancery, Lord Hardwicke was not influenced by that
group of juristic subjective intuitionalists which took an abstract view of justice, and which, according to Sir Henry
Maine, was making itself felt intellectually in mid-eighteenth
century English legal circles."5 Concerned with law in action,
he instinctively responded to the exigencies of the times,
sensing the necessity of an immutable justice, yet realizing
the essential flexibility of equitable rule, conscious of at least
the metaphysical unity of Law and Equity.
I
Standing out pre-eminently in the golden age of Chancery,
it was the extraordinary prerogative of Lord Hardwicke to
make momentous decisions concerning the extent to which
the ordering doctrines of stare decisis and aequitas sequitur
legem should be allowed to operate in the fashioning of the
equitable pattern. These were to be the mechanistic devices
for the construction of the equitable system, but they were
to be subordinated to the commanding ethico-sociological
14 1 Woonuous=-a,

op. dt. supra note 13, at 247.

15 See MAInE, ANcMNT LAw (World's Classics ed. 1931) 37. It was there
stated that "particularly at the middle and during the latter half of the eighteenth
century, the mixed systems of jurisprudence and morals constructed by the publicists of the Low Countries (Netherlands) . . . from the Chancellorship of Lord
Talbot to the commencement of Lord Eldon's Chancellorship . . . had considerable effect on the rulings of the Court of Chancery."
The pre-Reformational ideal of a natural law, which represented the starting
point of equitable trust philosophy, had been realized through the agency of
positive precepts laid down by the Chancellors, but these rules had never been
considered as the natural law, according to the Thomistic conception. In the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, two conflicting interpretations of the nontheoplalosophical (non-neo-scholastic) natural law grew up. one based on subjective intuitionalism, and the other on the possibility and desirability of stating
the natural law in code form. Lord Hardwicke's contributions reveal that he did
not agree with either of these two latter views. Thomism also rejects these two
views.
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ideal of conscionableness.' 6 These twin controls were to be
employed to determine rules which when systematically applied would measure claims put forward in the average case
since it was thought that justice would in this way be best
served. But Lord Hardwicke did not favor an encyclopedization of equitable norms which would have the effect of putting natural aequitas in a straight-jacket. While he sought to
make trust precedent conform generally to Common-Law
doctrines, yet he believed that this identification was not to
be an end in itself. The confinement of the judicial discretion
which was the inevitable result of the doctrine of stare decisis
was not to be complete according to Lord Hardwicke.17
As it was never the purpose of Chancery to overthrow
Common-Law rules, Lord Hardwicke maintained, except in
so far as this was necessary for the accomplishment of its
special aims, it was usually desirable for Equity to follow
the Law. This was in particular true in reference to proprietary principles. 8 These had been early laid down by the
Common Law before the birth of the Chancery court. Hence
Lord Hardwicke doubted whether Chancery had the authority or power to generate a set of fundamental proprietary
concepts different from those which prevailed at Law.1" Juridic necessity, coupled with the conviction that the common good would be jeopardized by conflicting and competing jural conceptions of property, impelled him to preserve
16 According to Lord Hardwicke, positive precepts were not to be' immutable, for this would elevate the legalistic above the moralistic.
17 See 1 Hoi.nswoRaH, op. cit. supra note 12, at 468.
18 Thus see Garth v. Baldwin, 2 Ves. Sen. 646, 655 (1755). See 7 HozwswoRT-, op. cit. supra note 12, at 73, referring to the fuller report of Hopkins v.

Hopkins, I Atk. 581 (1738), printed in Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 2 Jac. & W. 18
n. b.

Even in the first decade of the eighteenth century, Lord Cowper had been of
the opinion that as a general rule trusts were to be governed by the same conceptions and were within the same rational limits as legal estates, for if similar
principles of property did not obtain in both branches of the English juristic
system, there would be the utmost uncertainty. This trend of equitable construction was a maxim. See: Watts v. Ball, 1 P. Wms. 109 (1708); Banks v. Sutton, 2
P. Wims. 700, 713 (1732); Philips v. Philips, 1 P. Wrms. 35 (1701).
19

See 6 CANTBELL, Op. cit. supra note 1. at 114.
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one uniform rule and measure. 2' Though favoring the separation of Law and Equity, 2' Lord Hardwicke evidently foresaw that the merger of the two was a future possibility, so
that the increasing unity of England's legal order in the
eighteenth century must be encouraged. In the eighteenth
century, as Professor Holdsworth has pointed out,22 not only
was Chancery following the Law, but the Common Law in
turn was becoming more and more equitized.
Very early in his Chancellorship, Lord Hardwicke made it
plain, namely, in the case of Hopkins v. Hopkins, 28 that he
intended to support that equitable precedent which held that
trust estates should be governed by the same rules of property as legal estates. This precedent was to be found in
24
numerous cases, for example, the Duke of Norfolk's Case,
where Lord Nottingham had denied Chancery's authority to
establish different property rules from those which prevailed
at Law, and Bale v. Coleman,25 where Lord Harcourt stated
that the devise of a trust must be interpreted according to the
legal effect of the words. Other adjudications may be cited
to indicate that at the time of Lord Hardwicke, the equitable
ideal of justice was being realized largely through CommonLaw precepts, such as that of Tuffnell v. Page,2" 1740, where
he maintained that it was a general, settled rule that Equity
27
followed the Law, and Newcoman v. Bethlem Hospital,
1741, where he declared that he would not sanction proprietary principles in Chancery which contravened the Law. He
was advocating the general similarity of trust and legal es20

6

CAMPBEL,

op. cit. supra note 1, at 114.

For a full account of the gradual modification of Equity see, S HOLSWORT,

op. dt. spra note 12, at 336 ff. and 6
668 ff.

HOWDSWORTH,

o. cit. supra note 12, at

See WOODHOUSELE, op, cit. supra note 13, at 242.
7 HowswoRTH, op. Cit. supra note 12, at 74, 75.
West. T. Hard. 606, 619, 621 (1738-39).
3 Chan. Cas. 28 (1682).
1 P. Wins. 142, 145, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 309, 311 (1711).
26 Barn. C. 9, 13, Dickens 76, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 236, pl. 25 (1740).
27 Arnb. 8, 12, 13 (1741).

21
22
28
24
25
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tates as late as 1750, in the case of Gartk v. Cotton.28 Indeed his steadfastness to the general maxim, aequitas sequitur legem, was brought out in Gartk v. Baldwin, 9 'determined at the close of his Chancellorship. He had always,
therefore, relied upon this doctrine.
It was the opinion of Lord Hardwicke that this general
similarity between equitable and legal estates should extend
to such aspects of the trust as its limitation, transfer, devise,
descent, and escheat, and to the rule against perpetuities and
the operation of fines and recoveries. Soon after he became
Chancellor, he wrote:80
". .. limitations of trusts of terms of years, conditions, and contingencies annexed to them, springing trusts to arise upon the same
term, are always professed to be governed by the same rules as the like
limitations of the term itself would be at common law."

It was stated in Portsmouth v. Efflngham, 1 1750, that
"equity is to follow the same rule the law does as to the limitation of legal estates." To quote from his opinion in Garth
v. Baldwin, 2 1755:
"The principle, I go upon, is what I went upon in Bagshaw v. Spencer [1 Ves. Sen. 142 (1748)1; it is this principle, and not departed

from before or since, that in limitations of a trust either of real or personal estate to be determined in this court, the construction ought to
be made according to the construction of limitations of a legal estate
... with this distinction, unless the intent of testator or author of the
trust plainly appears to the contrary; but if the intent does not plainly
appear to contradict and over-rule the legal construction of the limitation, it never was laid down... that the legal construction should be
over-ruled by anything but the plain intent."

An examination of his decisions reveals that Lord Hardwicke endeavored to harmonize the rules pertaining to fiduciary and legal estates with regard to transfer and alienation. Numerous examples may be given. Thus, in 1739, he
28
29
So
Si

32

1 Ves. Sen. 546, 556 (1750).
Op. cit. supra note 18, at 655.
In Hervey v. Aston, West. T. Hard., 350, 426 (1737-1738).
I Ves. Sen. 430, 436 (1750).
Op. cit. supra note 18, at 655. See Bagshaw v. Spencer, 2 Atk. 570 (1743).
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explicity decided, in the case of Hopkins v. Hopkins,3 that a
cestui que trust enjoyed the same power of alienation or disposition over his equitable estate or interest as if it had been
legal. That a cestui que trust during the period of Lord Hardwicke might exercise his power of disposition by instruments
and solemnities such as were employed by the owner of the
legal estate was evident from such adjudications as Addling4 1744, and Jones v. Clough,"5 1751. In the forton v. Cann,"
mer of these cases, 8 it was held that one might no more dispose of a trust of land than he might of the legal estate in
such property, under the Statute of Frauds, without certain
solemnities.
In Marlborough v. Godolphin,"7 1750, Lord Hardwicke
ruled that Chancery had no greater latitude in the construction of wills, as a general rule, than a court of Law. Trust
estates were to descend after the manner of legal estates,
whiether they were customary, as Borough English or Gavelkind, or otherwise, to judge from such cases as Fawcet v.
Lowther,8" 1751. This movement toward greater identification of Law and Equity under Lord Hardwicke may be further illustrated by his statement that there should be an
escheat of a trust estate, just as there was of a legal estate,
under certain circumstances, although the contrary view had
prevailed prior to his time. Writing by way of dictum in
Fawcet v. Lowther, 9 he expressed the opinion that since all
the land in England would eventually be in trust, the doctrine of escheat would disappear, if there was no escheat of
a trust. Finally, he maintained in -the cause of Hopkins v.
38

Op. cit. supra note 23, at 620, 621.

S4

3 Atk. 141, 151 (1744).
2 Yes. Sen. 365, 366 (1751).
3 Atk. 141 (1744).

35
36

37 2 Ves. Sen. 61, 74 (1750).
38 2 Ves. Sen. 300, 303 (1751). See 1 MADwocz, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPL S AND PRACTICE OF THE HIOH COURT OF CLANCERY (3rd. ed. 1837) S76.

o

Op. cit. supra note 38, at 304.
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Hopkins,40 1738, that the principles of property and convenience held in the same manner with respect to trusts as to
legal estates to prevent perpetuities.
It was the view of Lord Hardwicke that the effects of fines
and recoveries by tenants in tail of trusts should be the same
as they would have been had the estates been legal rather
than equitable. In Hopkins v. Hopkins,41 1738, he confirmed
such seventeenth century precedent as Goodrick v. Brown,42
and such early eighteenth century cases as Banks v. Sutton,4"
and Penne v. Peacock," when he declared that a tenant in
tail of a trust might bar his issue by fine, and that such a
tenant, with remainders over, might dock the remainder by
a common recovery. Illustrative of the fact that, during Lord
Hardwicke's Chancellorship, the effect of a fine was the same
in Equity as it was at Common Law upon a legal estate is
the case of Willis v. Skorall," 1738. Similar rules applicable
to the barring of entails, therefore, were to obtain in both
jurisdictions.
By the first part of the eighteenth century, barring in
Equity might be accomplished by a fine or common recovery,4" but it was not certain that this was the only method,
although it was settled that no third way was open at Law. 7
Until Lord Hardwicke's decision in the case of Kirkham v.
Smith,4 8 1749, that a tenant in tail of a trust with remainders
over might bar these remainders only by means of a recovery, the point was doubtful. He there held " that a tenant
in tail of a trust estate with remainders over could not by
will or settlement bar the remainders without a recovery.
40
41

42
48
44

45
46
47
48

49

Op. cit. supra note 23, at 621.
Op. cit. supra note 23, at 621.
1 Chan. Cas. 49 (1664).
2 P. Wins. 700, 713 (1732).
Cas. T. Talbot 41, 43 (1734).
1 Atk. 475, 476, West. T. Hard. 584, 586 (1738).
Willis v. Shorall, I Atk. 475, 476, West. T. Hard. 584, 586 (1738).
See 7 HozwswoRm, op. cit. supra note 12, at 148.
1 Ves. Sen. 258, 260 (1749).
Amb. 518, 519 (1749).
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In that adjudication, he declared in reference to the argument that a lease and release should be sufficient to bar the
entail of a trust: "It never was so determined, and I hope
never will." " Thus a measure of restriction equivalent to
that demanded by the Common Law was imposed upon tenants in -tail of trusts. But he stated in Radford v. Wilson,"
1754, that a common recovery was never necessary to bar an
equitable estate tail in copyholds. He there wrote: "I am of
,opinion that an equitable estate tail in a copyhold will be
barred by surrender in the lord's court." 52 It was held,
moreover, in Robinson v. Cuming,53 1739, that an equitable
recovery would not bar a legal remainder. Chancery in this
period would not allow an unjust fine to be levied by beneficiaries who were thereby attempting to defeat the equitable
rights of 'Creditors. In Pomfret v. Windsor," 1752, it was adjudged that a fine levied by a beneficiary could not affect the
legal estate because he was merely a tenant at will to his
trustee, so there could be no disseisin in such an instance upon the trustee, and that a fine by beneficiaries who were in
possession, and non-claim, where the legal estate was in
trustees, would not bar an equitable charge though more
than five years had elapsed, if the result would be contrary
to justice.
II
But a synthesis of Lord Hardwicke's decisions indicates
that his acceptance of the theory that there should be a
correspondence between legal and trust estates was subject
to several exceptions. Thus in Hopkins v. Hopkins,5 1738,
he suggested that the general principle of similarity did not
50 Kirkham v. Smith, op. dt. supra note 48, at 260.
51 3 Atk. 815 (1754).
52 Radford v. Wilson, op. cit. supra note 51.
58 1 Atk. 473, 474 (1739), sub. nor. Robinson v. Comyns, Cas. T. Talbot
164.
54 2 Ves. Sen. 472, 481, 482 (1752). See 7 HoLDswoaRH, op. cit. supra note
12, at 149.

55 Op. cit. supra note 23, at 621.
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always apply. He pointed out that an "abundance of acts
are sufficient to pass the trust or equitable interest which
would not pass it at law." " He stated that when -the court
of Chancery found the rules of law right, it would follow
them, but then likewise it would go beyond them.5 Although
he generally favored Equity's adoption of Common-Law
tenets, still he defended Chancery's exclusive authority over
trusts,58 and the application of distinctive rules in the exercise of such jurisdiction.59 He declared in Harvey v. Aston,"
1738, that "all trusts are to be judged and only to be judged
by the rules and maxims of a Court of Equity."
Variations between the rules of the Common Law and
those of Chancery, in the era of Lord Hardwicke, for the
most part, were frequent relative to trusts and-frauds. It was
held, for example, in Man v. Ward, 1 1741, that in particular
instances only, when fraud was charged by a bill, or in cases
of trusts, Chancery refused to confine itself within the strict
precepts of the Common Law, but for the sake of justice
weighed the merits of the case to ascertain the fraud, or to
learn the actual intention of the trust or use declared in the
deed or will. 2 In regard to trusts, the rulings of the Common Law were not to be controlling, first, when the intent of
56 See Carte v. Carte, 3 Atk. 174, 179 (1744), Ridg. t. H. 210, 228.
57 See Paget v. Gee, Amb. 807, 810 (1753).
58 In Morris v. Burrows, West. T. Hard. 242, 246 (1737), Lord Hardwicke
placed Chancery's exclusive jurisdiction over trusts on the ground that only in an
equitable tribunal might the necessary directions be given for the proper carrying
out of fiduciary relationships. Several years later, in Willis v. Brady, Barn. C. 64,
68 (1740), he stated that the Common Law had no power over trusts. Again, in
Sturt v. Mellish, 2 Atk. 610, 612 (1743), he emphasized Chancery's exclusive right
to decide cases which involved the application of the law of trusts. See HoLLAND,
THE ErxmmqTs oF JURIsPRUDENCE (13th ed. 1924) 251, n. 1. It was his opinion
in Hubert v. Parsons, 2 Ves. Sen. 261, 262 (1751), that trusts were not to be
governed by the precepts of the ecclesiastical court. See Symson v. Turner, 1 Eq
Ca. Abr. 383 (1700); 3 BL. COMM. 439.

59 See Amb. 807, 810 (1753).
60 West T. Hard. 350, 366 (1737).
61 2 Atk. 228, 229 (1741). See Vn ooRADorr, ComOMO SE.s ni LAW (Home
University Library ed.) 219, where he states that there is an essential difference
of method between Equity and Law which makes it substantially impossible for
Chancery to follow a Law technique.
62 2 Atk. 229 (1741).
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the settlor plainly was contrary to the legal construction;.
secondly, when no dangerous proprietary consequences in the
social order would follow from Chancery's rejection of the
view of the Common Law, and when Chancery's distinctive
position was more conducive to natural justire; and thirdly,
when the rules of the Common Law allowed estates to be
obtained tortiously.
According to the decisions of Lord Hardwicke, there was to
be no legal interference with Chancery's effectuation of the
intents of settlors, when this was conceived of in a particular
case as a moral and ethical duty. Of-course, the intent of a
settlor who meant to have Chancery set up a competing system of property concepts would not be sustained.6" The superior equity of public policy and of the body politic had to
be recognized.6 4 But dangerous social and juristic results
would not follow if Chancery occasionally deviated from the
Common Law, in carrying out a settlor's intention, which
would have been thwarted if borrowed Common-Law tenets
had been adopted in the particular case. Thus Chancery of
the Hardwicke epoch continued to carry on its ancient tradition that faith must be kept, and intentions carried out. Lord
Hardwicke made it plain that under the proper circumstances
it was Chancery's duty to sustain a settlor's plain intent.6"
Obviously since Lord Hardwicke was greatly influenced to
make Equity follow the law because he was convinced that
the institution of private ownership, under the capitalistic
system, demanded certainty and hence but one basic system
of property law, and that grave public evils would otherwise
ensue, assurance that no hazardous proprietary consequeices
would result in the English Land Law and in society, from a
68 Lord Harcourt had tended to subordinate the dogma of intent by stating
that there should be a presumption of the consistency of the intents of settlors
and testators with the rules of law. See Bale v. Coleman, 1 P. Wins. 142, 145,
2 Vein. 670, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 309, pl. 14, 472, p1 . 1 (1711).
64 See FIsHER, BirocAr cAL SxETH oF MAiTLAND (1910) 71, cited by

Hohfeld, Relations between Equity and Law (1913) 11 MrcH. L. Rzv. 537, 45.
66 Man v. Ward, op. cit. supra note 61, at 229.
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variation by Equity from a particular rule of law justified his
taking an independent position, in the event that this was
more consonant with the spirit of Equity. Chancery might
take a distinctive view, therefore, when the result would not
be subversive of the Law. He believed with Lord Bacon that
"chancery was ordained to supply the law, and not to subvert the law." "
In the case of Hopkins v. Hopkins,6 7 1738, Lord Hardwicke mentioned variations between the fiduciary and legal
estates, first, in regard to ouster, and secondly, with respect
to merger. There "8 he expressed the view that Chancery
would.not allow a trust estate to be gained directly by disseisin, abatement, or intrusion, though these wrongs might
be perpetrated against the trustee, and as a result, the cestui
que trust might be affected. A trust estate might not be obtained tortiously as long as the trustee or trustees continued
in possession of the land. He pointed out, moreover, that
though there were numerous instances where there might be
mergers of legal estates, yet courts of equity never allowed
"mergers of trusts where the legal estate continued in the
trustees, but have been against the merger, if the justice of
the case required it." 89
III
Not only did Lord Hardwicke generally follow the substantive holdings of the Common Law in his creating the
science of trust law, but he also utilized its most characteristic'method, namely, the technique of stare decisis. He fully
06
C7

6 CAm.PBEL,

op. cit. supra note 1, at 114.

Op. cit. supra note 23, at 621, 622. See Scott, The Nature of the rights of
the Cestui que Trust (1917) 17 COL. L. REv. 270, 271, 274, 275. At 286, n. 59,
he cites Lewellin v. Mackworth, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 579 (1740), where Lord Hardwicke held that "Where a cestui que trust and his trustee are both out of possession for the time limited, the party in possession has a good bar against them
both." See Stone, The Nature of the Rights of the Cdstui que Trust (1917) 17
CoL. L. Rv. 467, 470.
8
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Vest.

T. Hard. 621, 622 (1738).

In Hopkins v. Hopkins, op. cit. supra note 23, at 622.
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appreciated "the advantage of general rules in restraining
caprice as well as corruption, and in letting the world know
how civil rights are defined and will be adjudicated."
It
was the repeated recurrence to these rules at the time of Lord
Hardwicke which enabled him to fulfill his mission of equitable scientist. The difficulty connected with the administration of all law, which results from the occasional conflict between adjudication according to specific, written rules, and
judgment in, conformity with naturhl justice, or to employ
the terminology of certain modern jurists, "justice without
law" challenged his genius. But he placed the greater emphasis upon the necessity of uniformity in the judging process.
The theory that the Chancellor should be allowed to exercise his discretion even in disregard of the precedents
which had been created by predecessors or by the Common
Law was still paramount at the time of Lord Hardwicke. 1
This was no more than the eternally necessary recognition
of the epikeia character of Equity, which must sometimes
depart from general, set rules when justice demands this in
the particular case. But paradoxically in this era, the discretion of the Chancellor was being curtailed by previous
decisions. Indeed this was true as early as the Chancellorship of Lord Nottingham.72 The extent to which Chancery
70
71
72

6 CAMBELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 232.

See Paget v. Gee, op. dt. supra note 57, at 810.
See: 1 HoLaswoaRH, op. cit. supra note 12 at 468 if; Chaplin v. Chaplin,
3 P. Wrs. 229, 234, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 384, pl. 9a, 385, pl. Ila (1733). In Chaplin
v. Chaplin, Lord Talbot wrote that "he took it to be settled that the husband
should be tenant by the curtesy of a trust, though the wife could not have
dower thereof; for which diversity, as he could see no reason, so neither should
he have made it; but since it had prevailed, he would not alter it." Sir J. Jekyll
declared in Banks v. Sutton, 2 P. Wims. 700 (1732). cited in 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 383,
that "be could not but wonder how it ever came to be thought that a tenant by
the curtesy was entitled to relief in equity, more or farther than a dowress . . .
therefore if any distinction is to be made, dower (one would thinkl ought to be
preferred to curtesy." In 1706, it was stated in Otway v. Hudson, 2 Veru. S85,
that "the widow of the cestui que trust of a copyhold estate ought to have her
free bench or widow's estate, as well as if the husband had had the legal estate
in him."
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was adhering to the doctrine of stare decisis in the periods
of Lords Nottingham and Hardwicke may be illustrated by
the manner in which they felt bound to follow the anomaly
that curtesy, but not dower, should be allowed out of a
trust estate, although they expressed personal objection to
such a view.
Strong precedent confronted Lord Hardwicke in support
of the doctrine that dower should not be allowed out of a
trust estate. 3 That he did not agree with this general tenet
appears from what he wrote in Casburne v. Inglis,4 1737,
namely,
"How it [this rule] came to be settled at first is of a different consideration, and perhaps it may be hard to find out a sound reason for
it;but it is safest to follow and adhere to that which has been settled

and established."
Accordingly he was holding in 1742 that it was an established principle that a widow was not dowable out of a
trust estate. In Ryall v. Rowles,7 1749, 1750, he stated
that a "widow is not entitled to a dower out of a trust estate; which obtained at first without being attended to."
Previously 7 he had expressed the opinion that:
"When any dissatisfaction has been expressed concerning any of the

determinations, it has generally been at the denying of dower to the
wife, not at the allowing an estate by the curtesy to the husband; and
if any alteration was to be introduced, the nearest way, in my humble
apprehension, to attain the mere right, would be to allow the wife to
have dower of a trust estate, not to disallow the tenancy by the curtesy

of the husband."

Here was an approval of the methodology of stare decisis,
therefore, which meant the rejection of a Common-Law rule,
73 Note 72, supra.

Lord Hardwicke agreed with both Sir J. Jekyll and Lord Talbot who did not
favor the distinction which equitable precedent has built, namely, that there
should be curtesy out of a trust but not dower.
74 West. T. Hard. 221, 231 (1737). See 3 HoLvswoaR,
op. cit. supra note
12, at 196.
75
Thus see Godwin v. Winsmore, 2 Atk. 525, 526 (1742).
76 1 Ves. Sen. 348, 357 (1749-1750).
77 Casburne v. Inglis, West. T. Hard. 221, 231 (1737).
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and a dictate of natural equity, for there was an admission
that there was no ethical justification for the position which
Chancery had assumed.
Occasionally Lord Hardwicke favored a difference between the rules pertaining to trust and legal estates, respectively, when strongly entrenched precedent in Chancery was
available to show that Equity had early decided not to follow the Common Law.78 True enough, the maxim of aequitas
sequitur legem had induced Chancery to imitate the Law in
allowing curtesy out of a trust estate.79 But it was not sufficient to overcome the effect of Equity's allegiance to the
theory of stare decisis in the matter of dower.8 0 In this respect, therefore, there was an ironical competition between
those two fundamental modes of juridical thought which
Lord Hardwicke so brilliantly coordinated in creating and
organizing the instrumentality through which justice was to
be expressed. This was ultimately due to the fact that no
dower had been recognized in regard to a use," though it
had been allowed out of a legal .estate.82 Later Chancery
rules were influenced, therefore, by the older principles which
governed uses prior to the Statute of Uses. 8 As to curtesy,
however, the technique of stare decisis was subordinated,
after this statute, to the philosophy of making equitable
principles resemble those favored by the Common Law.84
78

Op. cit. supra note 77.

79 Op. dt. supra note 77.
80 Op. cit. supra note 77.
81 See: 2 BL. Comm. 331; 7 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 12, at 73;
JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1913)

220; ScoTT, op. cit. supra note

67, at 272, 273.
Dower was allowed out of equitable estates as if they were legal in England
by the Statute 3 & 4 WI.L. IV, c. 105 (1834); but dower was there abolished
by Statute in 1925, and a share of the deceased's estate substituted. In the United
States dower may be had out of equitable estates, generally, of which the husband dies seised, in jurisdictions where dower still obtains.
82 See 7 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 12, at 73.
83 27 HEN. VIII, c. 10 (1535).
84 Thus it was held in Sweetapple v. Bindon, 2 Vern. 536 (1705), that a
husband was entitled to curtesy in the equitable interests of his wife. In Otway
v. Hudson, 2 Vern. 583,-585 (1706), it was adjudicated that the husband should

be "tenant by the courtesy of a trust, as well as of a legal estate." A similar
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Equity permitted a husband to obtain an estate by the curtesy out of his wife's trust estate of inheritance, notwithstanding the fact that curtesy had not been allowed out of
the estates which were held to her use.85
IV
The fruits of his Chancellorship were evidence that a natural-law jurisprudence is consonant with a scientific approach to law, and that it may be relied upon for the efficient satisfaction of contemporary social needs. Today when
jurists are claiming that legal science demands the abolition
of the medievalism of a natural law and contending that it
must not be fettered by the chains of an immutable justice.88
it is well to pause and hearken back to the lesson which is
contained in the pages which were written by Hardwicke.
He was a legal scientist who did not identify science with
mere factualism, but who transcendentalized the results arrived at by the empirical process of induction into the generality of principles, testing their validity through the opposite dialectics of deduction with respect to the rational
implications of a natural law. It was his skill in reconciling
opposites, and in adjusting the respective needs of the legal
and social orders that harbored the secret of his lasting greatness.
view was expressed in 1708, in Watts v. Ball, 1 P. Wins. 108, cited in 2 Eq.
Ca. Abr. 727, pl. 2, n. In that case, Lord Cowper, after declaring that in general the same rules were to apply to both trust and legal estates, stated that by
way of a particular instance a husband should be tenant by the curtesy out

of a trust estate on the same terms as if it had been a legal estate; otherwise
great uncertainty would prevail. See: 7 HOLD.WORTIr, Op. cit. supra note 12, at 73;
JzNxs, op. cit. supra note 81, at 220; 1 MADDOCK, op. Cit. supra note 38, at 272,n.
85 A husband might be a tenant by the curtesy of a trust in Chancery, but
two conditions must be fulfilled, first, the wife must have the inheritance, and,
secondly, there must be a seisin of the freehold during the coverture. See 3 Atk.
695, 711, 1 Ves. Sen. 298, 307 (1749).
86 See Kennedy: Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Law (1925) 9 MARQUETTE
L. REv. 63; Principles or Facts (1935) 4 FoRnHAm L. REv. 53; The Scientiffc
Approach in the Law (1936) 70 U. S. L. REv. 75. See THE NEW YORK LAW JOURN!A (February 13, 1936) 776.
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The work of Lord Hardwicke, therefore, whether viewed
from the standpoint of the legal historian, philosopher, or
encyclopedist is outstandingly significant in the realm of
trust law. Let us not forget the debt which we as lawyers
owe him in laying the foundation of trust science, upon
which subsequent generations of legalists were enabled to
erect what has come to be the glory of our juristic tradition.
The modern American jurist should remember with gratitude
that the science of Equity which was the out-growth of a
unique philosophy and a distinctive reaction to an already
existing legal system, namely, the Common Law, would have
had a different history and evolution if the master hand of
Hardwicke had not woven the strands of judicial decision
into the indestructible fabric of equitable jurisprudence.
Without his vision and balance, the science of trust law
might never have attained its present stature. The significance of this science is discernible in the enormous part which
the trust has played upon the stage of social and group enterprise, in the present extreme emphasis which is being
placed upon it by legal scholars, and in its future potentialities with respect to the solution of organization problems.
Let us at this time, standing as we are upon the threshold
of a memorable anniversary, make known to the whole legal
world the far-reaching significance of that crucial span of
of almost twenty years covering the Chancellorship of a
judge who was peerless in the judicial technique, supreme in
his ability to sense the full import of the opportunities given
him for creative interpretation, and unerring in his use of
legal logic. Let us now attest and acknowledge the supremacy
of his Chancellorship so that lawyers of the future who will
witness other centennials of the delivery of the Great Seal
to Lord Hardwicke may understand and know the reverence
which this age feels toward him. How splendidly has he been
eulogized in these words:

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
"His decisions have been, and ever will continue to be, appealed to
as fixing the limits, and establishing the principles, of that vast juridical system called EQUITY, which now, not only in this country and
in our colonies, but over the whole extent of the United States of
America, regulates property and personal rights more than the ancient
Common Law." 8 7

Brendan F. Brown.
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87 6 CAMPBELL, Op. dt. supra note 1, at 110. See: 1 HoLnswoRT39, op. Ct.
supra note 12, at 437; London Letter (1936) 22 Aim. BAR ASS'N Joua. 105; HARRIsoN, Great Sages of the Law (1934) 11 TAE LAw ST-DE T 7 ff.

